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ABSTRACT 
In this study attempt to estimate the impact of schooling attainment on an important indicator 
of labour market performance: wealth. OLS and IV regressions produced economically and 
statistically significant estimates, with OLS estimate of about 18 percent and IV estimate of 
about 30 percent when pooled DHS is used and about 56 percent when HNLSS data are 
employed. We have no evidence that OLS estimates are an artefact of the way the dependent 
variable is constructed or influential observations are driving observed outcome. In our IV 
regression specification, econometric tests prove that instrument is strong. Indicative and 
formal tests of instrument validity such as addition of new relevant variables, falsification 
tests, plausibly exogenous test and over-identification test are proofs of instrument validity. A 
number of econometric strategies implemented indicate that influential observations and 
selective migration are not biasing our results.  
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1.0 Introduction 
In 1976 the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) implemented nationwide Universal 
Primary Education (UPE) programme with the construction of over 21,000 new primary 
schools. The program was initiated to promote economic development and reduce regional 
inequality across North-South divide of Nigeria. Aside this, Lockheed and Verspoor (1991;1-
10) assert that the programme is expected to produce a number of positive individual and 
social benefits, which among other things should lead to increase labour market performance 
of programme beneficiaries.  
General evaluation of the programme by Taiwo (1980), Kosemani and Okorosaye-Orubite, 
(1995), Sanni and Ogonor, (2000), Nduka, (2000) Obanya, (2000 2002), Okobiah (2002) 
Jaiyeoba (2007) and Okorosaye-Orubite (2008) have not produced unambiguous results about 
programme’s success. Other studies (Bray, 1981; Sunal et al. 1989) address concerns about 
the quality of education received by beneficiaries. The recent studies (Osili and Long, 2008; 
Osili 2008; Maret, 2012) employing econometric approaches have shown that programme 
help to reduce fertility, child mortality, increased female labour force participation and 
greater female empowerment. As far as we know, no study has explored the labour market 
performance of UPE beneficiaries. Thus, we extend this econometric approach to investigate 
the labour market consequences of the UPE programme by using the exposure to the 
programme and its implementation intensity to instrument for schooling. Therefore, this 
study uses pooled 2008 and 2013 Nigeria’s Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) to 
examine the causal impact of the programme on wealth through its influence on individual 
educational attainment. Thus, we are able to produce unbiased and consistent Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) estimates from our IV strategy. A recent study by the author and 
other studies such as Osili and Long, (2008), Osili (2008) and Maret (2012) have shown that 
the programme has positive and significant impact on schooling attainment of beneficiaries.  
To minimize self-selection bias due to non-random missing observations on individual 
income or deliberate misreporting of income to data collectors, we resort to the use of 
household assets as an indicator of labour market performance. We compute wealth variable 
from these household durables using standard market prices supplied by National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS). An alternative approach uses Principal component analysis to compute 
another labour market performance indicator2. To avoid the confounding effects of Post-UPE 
Universal Basic Program that was initiated in 1999 and made compulsory in 2004, we limit 
our sample to those in 22-95 age brackets. In later specifications, we eliminated southerners 
who probably benefitted from previous regional UPE program that was widely implemented 
in the two regions of the south in the 1955-1966 period (Fafunwa, 1974). 
First, and in order to provide baseline estimates against which we can compare with IV 
results, we present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results of the impact of schooling on 
wealth. Our results show that a year of schooling is significantly correlated with wealth. A 
year of education increases wealth by 20 percent. These estimates are robust to the inclusion 
of several variables, which might affect our indicator of wealth status. Because we are not 
sure that omitted variables that might bias upward OLS estimates, we use alternative survey 
data and IV empirical strategy, which allows us to check the extent to which omitted 
variables might be affecting OLS results. With the alternative data, we are to control for 
important variables such as vocational training, adult education, parental education, 
migration, school quality, natural ability, religion, political affiliation in our IV specifications. 
                                                                 
2 Using the DHS constructed as the main wealth indicator while desirable raises serious issue of interpretation. 
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To evaluate the wealth effect of the UPE program, we resort to IV strategy that exploits the 
accident of exposure to the program itself. This is aside the fact that the IV identification 
strategy ameliorates potential biases from OLS regressions due to endogeneity and 
measurement error problems. Since the official school entry age is six at the outset of the 
programme, we assume that those born between 1970 and 1974 (that is those within 2-6 age 
bracket in 1976) are UPE beneficiaries. Thus, UPE instrument is an indicator variable for 
cohorts exposed to the programme. Our IV result shows that a year of schooling increases 
wellbeing by 30 percent when we use the pooled DHS datasets and 57 percent when we use 
2009 Harmonized National Living Standard Survey (HNLSS). These estimates are 
significantly higher than the OLS estimate. Results are robust to the inclusion of time 
invariant and time varying variables, which might confound our estimates of schooling 
variable. The IV estimate remains significant at 1 percent when a number of robustness tests 
were implemented. The F-statistic from the first stage regression shows that our instrument 
set is very strong. This study also shows that selective migration does not constitute a major 
source of bias for OLS and IV estimates. Influential observations do not appear to be 
responsible for observed outcome. 
To address concerns about validity of our instruments, we developed two other placebo UPE 
laws and performed some falsification tests based on these placebo laws. There is no 
significant correlation between each of these false instruments and wealth. Nigeria is 
probably one of few countries in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) that introduced UPE programme 
in the mid-1970. Thus, if we use data from other African countries and assumed falsely that 
they implemented UPE in 1976 and operated it nationwide until 1981, the relationship 
between the placebo UPE instrument and wealth index should be zero and insignificantly 
different from zero. That exactly was what we found. The coefficients of the UPE 
instruments of other African countries turn out to be statistically insignificant.  
Observed results cannot be attributed to pre-UPE schooling attainment trend. We fail to find 
evidence that rising household and national prosperity created the demand for the 
programme. Macroeconomic conditions at the time of labour market entry or entry before or 
after 1986 cannot responsibly account for observed wealth. We constructed an alternative 
instrument based on the assumption that school entry age is 5 years. We did this in order to 
implement direct test of overidentification. Our over-identification test fails to reject the 
exogeneity of main instrument. The paper also shows that the UPE programme did not have 
any negative impact on non-beneficiaries, eliminating concerns that general equilibrium 
effects of the programme might be substantially negative. 
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the UPE 
programme in Nigeria. Section 3 provides background descriptive statistics of some of the 
selected variables. In section four we present OLS results and addresses issues around the use 
of wealth as dependent variable. In section five, we present IV results. In section six, we 
address concerns about instrument validity using variety of additional econometric strategies. 
In section seven we discuss the results of previous studies in comparison with the one 
obtained here. We summarized in this study in section eight. 
2.0 Overview of the UPE Programme in Nigeria  
The Federal Government of Nigeria initiated the Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
programme in 1974 and began its implementation in 1976 (Obasi, 1997; Ozigi and Ocho, 
1981). The objective of Nigeria’s UPE program was to provide tuition-free universal primary 
school education for six years. The official school entry age for the UPE program was put at 
 
 
4 
 
six years by the federal government. Urban areas had most schools constructed at the initial 
stage of the programme (Ozigi and Ocho, 1981). 
 
The objective of Nigeria’s UPE program was to provide tuition-free universal primary school 
education for first six years of basic education. One important reason for initiating this 
programme was to bridge the large gap in the schooling attainments of people in the Southern 
and Northern parts of Nigeria.  For instance, why there were 4,225 primary schools in 
Northern Nigeria in 1974, the south had 10,313 primary schools (Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, 1981). It was, however, during the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo 
that the UPE programme implementation began in 1976. The third National Development 
that overlaps the period of UPE implementation made provision for the expansion of 
classrooms. The plan made provisions for 107,505 primary school classrooms in the northern 
states and 35, 045 classrooms in the southern states (Osili, 2008). As a results of the UPE 
programme, pupils enrolment rose from 6 million pupils in 1976 to 12 million by 1980 
(Francis, 1998). While the program was terminated in 1981 by the deferral government, by 
1982 pupils’ enrolments had risen to 14.5 million nationwide. It is noteworthy that post-1981, 
growth in pupils enrolment has not been as dramatic as it was during the UPE programme 
(Francis, 1998). 
In the immediate pre-independence years, the major regions in the South started the 
implementation of free Universal Primary Education. Lagos, then the Federal Capital 
Territory, was not left out. However, the programme started in the western region of Nigeria. 
The implementation started in January 1955. Lagos as the Federal Capital Territory outside 
the control of South-West started its UPE programme in January 1957. A month later, the 
Eastern region launched its own UPE programme. The Northern section did introduce 
conditional UPE programme in 1958. It ordered similar UPE policy could be implemented by 
localities when qualified teachers are available. Thus, it is actually difficult to say whether 
what was implemented could be the equivalent of a UPE programme. For whatever it is 
worth, UPE programme in the North was nothing in magnitude to what was implemented in 
the various parts of the southern regions. Since 1999, the federal government has re-
introduced the program as Universal Basic Education (UBE), extending free basic education 
to the first nine years of schooling and making it compulsory. There is also now pre-primary 
component of the basic education program. To avoid the confounding effects of UPE 
program implemented before or after the 1976 UPE program, we eliminated observations that 
because of age could have benefitted from these programs.  
 
3.0 Data Description & Preliminary Analysis 
The study uses essentially 2008 and 2013 pooled Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
National population Commission (NPC) collects the data. In addition, we use 2009 
Harmonized National Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) collected by National Bureau of 
Statistic (NBS) to provide complementary evidence on the impact of the UPE program on 
wealth. Like most micro data collected by (NPC) and (NBS), both HNLSS and (DHS) are 
collected using the multi-stage stratified random sampling method. These household data use 
the sampling frame provided by the National population Commission (NPC). It is based on 
36 states, a federal capital territory (F.C.T) and 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), which 
we will sometimes refer to as districts. 
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The 2009 HNLSS data collected by NBS in collaboration with the World Bank. It uses a two-
stage sampling method. The survey involves the selection of 10 Enumeration Areas (EAs) 
from each district located in 36 states of the federation and the F.C.T and the selection of 
households from each Enumeration Area. It adds up to 100 households per district and 77, 
400 households across the Nation. The 2006 Housing and Population Census provided the 
appropriate sampling frame for the Enumeration Areas selected in the 774 LGAs for the 
2009/2010 HNLSS. In a two-stage sample design process, the first stage involves the 
selection of enumeration areas and the second involves the selection of households. DHS and 
HNLSS provide data on the status of an average Nigerian household’s covering issues of 
demography, health, Fertility behavior, Education and Skills/Training, housing and housing 
condition, migration, social capital, agriculture, asset ownership, crime & security 
consumption and expenditure. We used 2006-2009 General Household Survey (GHS) and 
2010 National Literacy Survey (NLS) and other data when we needed additional evidence to 
support our results. From these data sources, we select a number of variables and constructed 
others while incorporating data from other data sources. Some of the variables we constructed 
include UPE exposure and LGA UPE intensity 
 
The UPE exposure instrument is constructed using age of respondents in the pooled DHS and 
HNLSS to determine who benefitted from the UPE program. Assuming 6 years as age of 
school entry, we calculate that only those born between 1970 and 1974 benefitted from the 
program. Younger or older cohorts did not. Dummy variable is constructed by assigning 1 to 
1970-1974 cohorts and zero to others. To obtain a measure of the intensity of program 
implementation, we constructed for each LGA the enrolment rate before the start of the 
programme. This is because funds were allocated to different districts based on pre-
programme LGA enrolment rate. 
 
 
Panel A Table 1.0 provides preliminary information on some of the key variables used in our 
regression analysis. In column 1, the means and standard errors of these variables are 
presented for sampled respondents 22 years and above. To prevent the confounding effects of 
Universal Basis Education (UBE) programme, we excluded from our regression analysis 
observations below 22 years. The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) restarted UBE 
program in 1999 and extended it to cover the first nine years of basic education. In the next 
two columns, we show some descriptive statistics for those born 1970-1974 and those born 
1958-1963. The former benefitted from the 1976 UPE program by virtue of time of birth and 
the latter group did not. The last column shows the differences between the groups while we 
use T-Test to check for the statistical significance of the differences.  
 
While the mean value of wealth is N144016, it is N8920.6 more for those born 1970-74 than 
those born 1958-63. Similarly, the difference in the schooling attainment of the two groups is 
nearly two years (row two). The differences in wealth and schooling attainment for both groups 
are statistically significant at 1 percent. The central argument of this paper is that the 1976 UPE 
program accounts for difference in schooling attainment between UPE cohorts and non-UPE 
cohorts, and is affecting wealth through schooling. However, there are potential confounding 
variables that come to play. From Table 1.0, it is clear also that there are statistically significant 
differences between the two groups with respect to marital status, sector of residence and access 
to electricity. Greater number of UPE cohorts live in urban areas and have better access to 
electricity, though smaller proportion are married relative to 1958-83 cohorts. UPE cohorts 
apparently do not have older co-ethnics who have invested more in schooling relative to the 
comparison group. There is also no pronounced differences between the two groups when we 
consider gender and access to water variables. We provide detailed regression analysis and the 
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accompanying diagnostics to reinforce the central argument that UPE program, by exogenously 
raising the schooling attainment, increase wealth considerably. Our specification control for a 
broad range of variables. 
 
Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics   
Population variances of samples in columns 1 & 2 are assumed to be unknown. However, we 
assumed equal variances for the two samples when their standard deviations are not 
significantly different from each other. *Significant at 1 percent. 
 
For a study of this kind the dependent variable should normally be income, or to be precise 
earnings per hour. In a developing country setting, this is not an information most sampled 
respondents would be willing to divulge, aside the fact that accuracy of the information may be 
in doubt. For GHS data that collects data on individual earnings in Nigeria, there are 
considerable number of missing data in a non-random manner. This exacerbates the inherent 
self-selection biases in studies of this kind. In Panel B Table 1.0, we show for selected variables 
the descriptive statistics for those who are between 22 and 64 years . The choice of 22-64 cohorts 
is guided by the need to exclude UBE cohorts and older respondents outside the labour force. 
Column 1 reports the means and standard errors of these cohorts, and in columns 2 and 3 split 
these cohorts in those who report the income and those did not.  
 
Column 4 shows whether for each of the variables listed in the table, there are statistically 
significant differences between those who report and those who did not report the ir income. As 
Panel A     
Variables  Respondents 22 
Years& Above (A) 
Respondents Born 
1970—1974 (B) 
Respondents Born 
1958—1963 (C) 
Difference 
Between B & C 
99 Percent CI 
Wealth (In Naira) 144016     
(210929.5)   
154648     
(217219.9) 
145727.4    
(219422.2) 
 
N8920.6* 
(2500.385) 
Schooling 5.993609    
(5.766693) 
6.687332    
(5.659697) 
 
4.819238    
(5.696347) 
 
1.868094* 
(0.0648545) 
Gender Dummy 0.4853043    
(0.5023088) 
0.4996595    
(0.5000154) 
 
0.49101    
(0.4999359) 
 
0.0086495 
(0.0056729)   
Age 41.25956    
(15.40607)   
38.21826    
(2.759077) 
 
49.95054    
(3.203038) 
 
-11.73228* 
(0.0338214) 
Sector Dummy 0.3644664    
(0.4812819) 
0.3688641     
(0.482512) 
 
0.3405521    
(0.4739107) 
 
0.028312* 
(0.0054281) 
Marital Status 0.8562172    
(0.3508706) 
0.9518613    
(0.2140659)  
 
0.9881653    
(0.1081455) 
 
-0.036304* 
(0.0019101) 
Ethnic Capital 1.854667      
(0.907525) 
1.826958    
(0.8943965) 
 
1.844268    
0.9206987 
 
-0.01731 
(0.0103438) 
Time to Get to Water 
Source (in minutes) 
261.5605    
(417.6454) 
262.1999    
(418.2074) 
 
261.1251    
(416.7968) 
 
1.0748 
( 4.73746) 
Electricity Access 
Dummy 
0.5070478    
(0.4999521) 
  0.5102041    
(0.4999114) 
 
0.4812085    
(0.4996635) 
 
0.0289956* 
(0.0056771) 
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seen from Panel B Table 1.0, there are statistically significant differences in the characteristics 
of the two groups.   
 
Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics   
Population variances of samples in columns 1 & 2 are assumed to be unknown. However, we 
assumed equal variances for the two samples when their standard deviations are not 
significantly different from each other. NA is not applicable. *Significant at 1 percent.  
 
The more educated and younger cohorts are less willing to report income. Greater proportion of 
those living in rural areas and those in paid employment are less inclined to report their income 
relative to those in urban areas and those in self-employment. Thus, those with regular stream 
of income, which can be estimated accurately are less likely to report their earnings compared 
to those with irregular income and whose incomes are  difficult to estimate accurately. It is also 
noteworthy that greater percentage (2.5 percent) of those not reporting income report some 
unemployment spell in the course of the last one year than those who report their incomes (1.19 
percent). Since a substantial proportion of those in self-employment are engaged in farming and 
Panel B: 2006-09 GHS     
Variables  Respondents 
Between 22 & 64 
Years (A) 
Respondents 
With Income 
Data (B & C) 
Respondents 
Without Income 
Data (C) 
Difference 
Between B & C 
99 Percent CI 
Income Per Hour  
(In 1,000 of Naira) 
0.4738115     
(5.95927) 
0.4779064    
(5.984803) 
NA NA 
Schooling (years) 9.657765    
(4.108789)    
9.362127    
(4.123832) 
 9.996088    
(4.065267) 
-0.633961*     
(0.029029) 
Age 38.01984    
(11.16669) 
40.87507    
(10.86344) 
35.17301     
(10.72962) 
5.70206*    
(0.0576194) 
Gender Dummy 0.4772387    
(0.4994834) 
0.6255598    
(0.4839815) 
0.3293269    
(0.4699722) 
0.2962329*    
(0.0025461) 
Sector Dummy 0.251141     
(0.433671) 
0.2631849    
(0.4403651) 
0.2391326    
(0.4265569) 
0.0240523*    
(0.0023136) 
Self-employment 0.012311    
(0.1102704)    
0.0207935    
(0.1426935) 
0.0038535    
(0.0619576) 
0.01694*    
(0.0005873) 
Paid-Employment 0.0766076    
(0.2659687) 
0.1263584    
(0.3322552) 
0.0270032    
(0.1620938) 
0.0993552*    
(0.0013957) 
Unemployment (During 
the Year). 
0.0155493    
(0.1237244)    
0.0119919      
(0.10885) 
0.0251448    
(0.1565681) 
-0.0131529*    
(0.0010784)   
Radio (Number) 1.014629    
(0.6948219)   
0.9536371    
(0.6219025) 
1.170468     
(0.833275) 
-.2168309*    
(0.0073194) 
TV (Number) 0.9389465    
(0.8020063)   
0.8143608    
(0.7008354) 
1.189331    
(0.9246372) 
-0.3749702*    
(0.0095651) 
Mobile (Number) 0.9456909    
(0.6935945)   
0.8450388    
(0.6089889) 
1.135711    
(0.7961952) 
-0.2906722    
(0.0069906) 
Fixed Phone (Number) 0.6982298    
(1.060156) 
0.2254023    
(0.8033865) 
1.198685    
(1.069288) 
-0.9732827*    
(0.0137478) 
PC (Number) 0.7148858    
(1.065525) 
0.280271    
(0.8886165) 
1.188778    
(1.040113) 
-.908507*    
(0.0139063) 
UPE Exposure 0.139003    
(0.3459509) 
0.1457115    
(0.3528193) 
0.1323143    
(0.3388345) 
0.0133972*     
(0.001846) 
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other vocations that have considerable seasonal component, reported incomes from this 
category of workers might come with some noise. They also turn out to be wealthier in terms of 
ownership of assets such as radio, television, personal computers, mobile and fixed phones. 
However, slightly greater number of UPE beneficiaries are  willing to report their incomes than 
beneficiaries those not willing. The pronounced differences between these two groups could 
partly explain why there are significant differences in regression estimates that use  wealth and 
earnings as dependent variables. OLS results for regressions using earnings are significantly 
lesser than those using wealth. Considerable number of missing non-random observations 
makes our UPE instrument to be extremely weak, and estimates of schooling variable 
completely unreliable.  
 
4.0 Econometric Model and Empirical Results 
 
4.01. OLS Estimates 
 
We begin by estimating the relationship between the years of schooling the and indicator of 
well-being. Our baseline estimating equation (1) is:  
 
                         (1) 
 
where Witk the natural logarithm of the monetary value of the wealth of individual i at time t 
resident in LGA k. Market price information supplied by NBS is used to compute individual 
wealth, summing up the monetary value of all assets reported in both 2008 and 2013 NDHS. 
Similarly, Sisk is the years of schooling of individual i resident in state s and LGA k. In 
addition, we have  as a set of state, LGA and geopolitical region fixed effect variables to 
pick unobserved variables driving outcomes aside schooling attainment and other control 
variables (X). . 
 
From the column 1 of Panel A Table 2.0, schooling attainment has strong and positive impact 
on economic wellbeing. On the average, an extra year of education increases wealth status by 
24.23 percent. This translates to about N6756.23 rise in wealth for an additional year of 
schooling. When variables such as age and age-squared are included in regression reported in 
column 2, sector dummy to column 3, gender dummy to column 4, household size to column  
5 and marital status dummy to column 6, coefficient of schooling attainment reported in 
column 1 declines marginally to 22.05 percent. When ethnic capital variable is added to the 
regression reported in column 7 and time-dummy is added to that in column 8, estimate of 
schooling variable reduces marginally to 20.39 percent.  
 
In column 9, we regress logarithm of individual income per hour on schooling attainment, 
gender dummy, age, age-squared, sector dummy and time using pooled 2006-2009 GHS 
datasets. The estimate for schooling variable is 3.24 percent, considerably smaller than 
estimates reported using wealth variable. However, the estimate is statistically significant 
though has minimal economic significance. This is probably because of the income data, 
which is missing for a non-random fraction of the sample. Running separate regressions for 
GHS 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 did not yield any economically meaningful estimates for 
schooling variable, except for GHS 2009, which is 12.00 percent, though statistically 
insignificant at 10 percent (columns 1-4 appendix 2). Similarly, separate regressions for 2008 
and 2013 DHS with wealth as dependent variable yield economically and statistically 
significant estimates (columns 5-6 appendix 2), which in quantitative terms are similar to  
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TABLE 2.0: OLS Regression Results Dependent Variable (Log of Monetary Value of Wealth & Log of Earnings Per Hour for Column 9).  
Variables/column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Survey 2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 2013 
DHS 
2006-09 GHS 
Dependent 
Variable 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth 
(Log) 
Wealth (Log) Income Per Hour 
(Log) 
Schooling (years) 0.2423***  
(0.0015) 
0.2377***   
(0.0016) 
0.1964***    
(0.0017)    
0.1987***   
(0.0017) 
0.2159***   
(0.0017) 
0.2205***   
(0.0017) 
0.2080***    
(0.0019) 
0.2039***   
(0.0018) 
0.0324***   (0.0062) 
Age & Age2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Gender Dummy No No No Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household Size &  
Household 2  
No No No No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  no 
Marital status  No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ethnic Capital No No No No No  Yes  Yes  No 
Time-Dummy No No No No No No No Yes  Yes  
Observations 137503 137372 137372 137372 137372 135652 134748 134748 45520 
F-Statistics 25257.38 8568.06 8171.98 6571.48 5213.66 4526.86 4021.87 3765.23 31.29 
R-Squared 0.1376 0.1395 0.1666 0.1668 0.1974 0.1981 0.2001 0.2089 0.0046 
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Age2 is age-squared. Household 2 is 
household size squared. 
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estimates reported in Table 2.0. In case omitted variables are driving estimates, we control for 
geopolitical region, state and LGA fixed effects separately in regressions reported in columns 
1, 2, and 3 of appendix 3.  All fixed effects variables are added in column 4. If geographic 
factors are important in determining wealth, adding variables such as LGA latitude, longitude 
and altitude could lead to drastic reduction in the estimate of schooling variable. However, as 
seen in columns 5-7 Appendix 3, adding these variables has barely any effect on the estimates 
of schooling variable. 
 
We explore whether the impact of schooling attainment may differ along gender and sector 
dimensions. Results are shown in Appendix 4. In columns 1-2, we report regressions that 
account for potential heterogeneity along these lines. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates for 
male and female sample respectively. Both estimates are positive and significant at 1 percent, 
with higher estimate reported for female sample. A year of schooling raises wealth by 17.8 
percent for a male and 20.87 percent for female. Rural sample in column 3 (19.72 percent) is 
higher than urban estimate reported in column 4 (17.63 percent). Estimates for rural and 
urban samples are significant at 1 percent. 
 
However, different parts of the country have varying degree of urbanization that could be 
influencing reported estimates. Thus, locations such as Lagos and Abuja have greater urban 
representations. Similarly, all states from the South-West of Nigeria have greater 
urbanization level than other locations. The unequal distribution of amenities and 
opportunities across space could bias OLS estimates. To correct for this potential source of 
bias, we exclude one after the other observations from FCT, Lagos and Abuja and South-
West in regressions reported in columns 5-7 (Appendix 4).The estimates of schooling 
variable remain relatively unchanged. Estimates are still significant at 1 percent. Dropping 
each of the other state one at time has not affected the statistical significance of the schooling 
coefficients.  Similarly, implementing OLS regressions for each of the 36 states and Federal Capital 
Territory (F.C.T) produced coefficients of schooling variables that are statistically significant at 1 
percent. Similarly, limiting regression to 22-64 cohorts to check whether the inclusion of 65 
years plus cohorts may be driving outcome has barely no effect on schooling coefficients3. 
 
4.0.2 Alternative Indicators of Wealth Index As A Dependent Variable 
 
The use of wealth as dependent comes with a number of concerns. It is also possible that 
household assets could have been received as gifts, and thus unrelated to the actual economic 
status of individuals. Household head may exclusively owned assets assigned to all 
individuals within the household, and in some cases jointly owned with the spouse. Analysis 
of the 2012 Panel General Household Survey data collected by National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) reveals that the household head owns 95 percent of durable assets in the home, another 
4 percent by the spouse and the remainder jointly owned by all members. To deal with these 
concerns, we estimate a number of alternative specifications with different dependent 
variables. We adopt four different approaches.  
 
First, we selected assets that are more likely to be owned by individuals in the home. This 
includes motorcycle, car and mobile phones. In columns 1-3 Table 3.0, we show the results 
of probit regressions. Schooling is still significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
possessing a motorcycle, a car and a mobile phone. Two, we use the wealth index produced  
                                                                 
3 Results not shown but available upon request. 
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Table 3.0 Alternative Indicators of Wealth As Dependent Variable  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Assets Motorcycle Car Mobile 
Phone 
Wealth 
Index 
Wealth 
ranking 
Wealth 
(Household 
Head Only) 
Wealth 
(One-Person 
Household) 
Schooling (years) 0.0189***  
(0.0008) 
0.0915***   
(0.0012) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0019) 
7975.3***   
(43.57) 
0.0989***   
(0.0006) 
0.2611***   
(0.007) 
0.2527***   
(0.0079) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regression Technique Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 136626 136627 136475 137222 137222 13998 9613 
Wald chi2(16)/ F-Stat 9827.44 11734.51 2378.94 16979.82 18627.88 421.79 358.26 
Pseudo R2/ R-squared             0.0598 0.1740 0.0969 0.6123 0.5943 0.3355 0.3775 
Other control variables include age, age -squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, household size, household size squared,  
marital status dummy, ethnic capital and time dummy, fixed effects for geo-political region, state, LGA, LGA Latitude,   
LGA Longitude and LGA altitude. NA is not available. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗  
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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DHS body. This index is derived from a principal components analysis of all households’ assets 
and housing characteristics of sampled respondents. From column 4, it is clear that schooling is 
significantly correlated with DHS wealth index at 1 percent level. In columns 6 and 7, we return 
to the use of previous wealth variable computed from NBS market price information chart. The 
column 6 regression is restricted to household head only sample and column 7 to one-person 
household sample. In both cases, schooling variable remain statistically significant at 1 percent, 
rising modestly to 26.11 and 25.27 percent for columns 6 and 7. 
  
 
5.0 Instrumental Variable Strategy  
 
5.0.1 Preliminary Background Analysis 
 
Reported OLS regressions may not have convincingly handled the omitted variables problems, 
just as endogeneity of schooling variable and measurement error are still important sources of 
biases. More importantly, OLS regressions do not constitute an evaluation of the UPE program 
in terms of wealth effect. Our final strategy is to use IV method to resolve these potential sources 
of bias. The IV strategy allows us to estimate the wealth returns to schooling for UPE 
beneficiaries.  
 
Our IV identification technique depends on the exposure to UPE program, which depends largely 
on year of birth if we assume the school entry age is 6 years. For those born between 1970 and 
1974, they fall within the category of beneficiaries because they were just within 2-6 age range 
when the program commenced in 1976. A comparison group born 1958-1963 were between 13-
18 age ranges in 1976, and could not have benefitted from the program. Indicator variables 
should have differential impact on schooling attainment and wealth for UPE and comparison 
groups. If we constructed 11 indicators for year of birth (6 for 1958-1963 cohorts and 5 for 1970 
and 1974). We show the results in Table 4.0 after regressing schooling attainment and wealth on 
these 11 indicator variables and other covariates.  
 
Generally, year of birth indicator variables for 1958-1963 cohorts have negative and statistically 
significant effects on schooling attainment and wealth of sampled respondents, while indicator 
variables for 1970-1974 have positive and statistically significant effect on schooling and wealth 
(columns 1-4). In columns 2 and 4, we see how much less schooling and wealth each of the pre-
UPE cohorts have relative to UPE cohorts. We also see how much more schooling and wealth 
UPE cohorts have relative to pre-UPE cohorts. In fact, UPE cohorts have nearly 0.5 year more 
schooling and 17.17 percent more wealth relative to 1958-1963 cohorts. The UPE program effect 
on treated cohorts and cohorts just before the program started is a kind of event-study regression 
analysis that shows the impact of program before and during the event. It shows that trend of 
schooling attainment across cohorts might not be driving our results. Columns 5 and 6 reveal 
what happens when we account for the impact of schooling attainment in a reduced-form 
regression with wealth as a dependent variable. Most of the 11 year of birth indicator variables 
become statistically insignificant when schooling attainment variable is introduced into the 
specifications (column 5). In the same vein, the UPE indicator becomes insignificant as 
schooling variable is added into the specification (column 6). This provides some preliminary 
evidence in support of exclusion restriction condition, which our UPE exposure instrument must 
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satisfied for IV regression to generate consistent estimates for schooling variable. Results of 
reduced-form regression reported in Table 4.0 indicates that exposure to UPE program might be 
a good instrument. Later, we provide additional evidences to show that our instrument is at least 
plausibly exogenous. It is also unlikely weak instrument related bias is of serious concerns in this 
study.  
 
TABLE 4.0: Background Reduced Regressions (The Event Style-Study Regressions) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable Schooling 
Attainment 
Schooling 
Attainment 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Schooling Attainment No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Born 1958 Indicator 
Variable. 
-1.532***   
(0.2377) 
-2.030***   
(0.1917) 
-0.393***    
(0.0982) 
-0.6238***   
(0.1381)   
-0.1689*  
(0.0955) 
-0.2482*   
(0.1336) 
Born 1959 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.6855***     
(0.2406) 
-1.135***   
(0.2054) 
-0.1331  
(0.1156) 
-0.3342**   
(0.1437) 
-0.0275   
(0.1108) 
-0.0947   
(0.1378) 
Born 1960 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.6284***   
(0.2053) 
-1.024***  
(0.1733) 
-0.0081   
(0.0936) 
-0.1817  
(0.1199) 
0.0792 
(0.0899) 
.0266496   
(0.1152) 
Born 1961 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.5248***   
(0.1874) 
-0.8571***   
(0.1630) 
0.0095   
(0.094) 
-0.1357   
(0.1121) 
0.0785  
(0.0902) 
0.0328   
(0.1080) 
Born 1962 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.2091  
(0.1915) 
-0.4958***   
(0.1742) 
0.0359   
(0.1079) 
-0.0822   
(0.1200) 
0.0569   
(0.1031) 
0.0292   
(0.1146) 
Born 1963 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.8890***  
(0.1296) 
-1.1116***   
(0.1128) 
-0.145 ** 
(0.0703) 
-0.2376**   
(0.0816) 
0.00567   
(0.0683) 
-0.0105   
(0.0789) 
Born 1970 Indicator 
Variable. 
0.6165***   
(0.1296) 
No  0.1363**   
(0.0687) 
No  0.0355   
(0.0663) 
No  
Born 1971 Indicator 
Variable. 
0.4703***   
(0.1481) 
No  0.2024***   
(0.0644) 
No  0.1411**   
(0.0619) 
No  
Born 1972 Indicator 
Variable. 
0.4281**  
(0.1763) 
No  0.1185  
(0.0773) 
No  0.0833   
(0.0749) 
No  
Born 1973 Indicator 
Variable. 
-0.3519**  
(0.1702) 
No  0.1840***   
(0.0460) 
No  -0.0730   
(0.0448) 
No  
Born 1974 Indicator 
Variable. 
0.9119***  
0.2154155 
No  0.2982***   
(0.0685) 
No  0.1859**   
(0.0666) 
No  
UPE Indicator No  0.4987***  
(0.1161) 
No  0.1747**   
(0.0799) 
No 0.0795   
(0.0770) 
Control Variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 71208 71208 70570 70570 69857 69857 
F-Statistics 1947.04 2221.63 521.05 467.65 705.64 658.75 
R-Squared 0.3664 0.3649 0.1541 0.1545 0.2162 0.2163 
Other control variables include age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, marital status dummy, 
ethnic capital and time dummy, fixed effects for geo-political region, state, LGA, LGA Latitude, LGA 
Longitude and LGA altitude. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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5.0.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Results 
 
In the second-stage regression results shown in Panel A Table 5.0, and starting with bivariate 
regression indicated in column 1, estimate show a positive and highly significant effect of the 
schooling attainment on wealth. A year of schooling increases individual wealth by 43.55 
percent, which is significant at 1 percent. This is nearly twice as high as OLS estimates 
reported in column 1 of Panel A Table 2.0. In column 2 Panel A Table 5.0, we introduce 
variables such as age, age-squared and dummies for sector, gender and marital status as 
additional controls. Estimate of schooling declined dramatically to 19.35 percent, but is still 
significant at 1 percent.  
 
Previous investment of various ethnic groups within the polity partly determine the current 
schooling attainment adult population. Ethnicities with poor prior records of human capital 
investment could be more or less willing to participate in the UPE program than other ethnic 
groups. Thus, the UPE instrument could be correlated with ethnic capital, producing bias 
estimates. To remove this potential source of bias, we control for ethnic capital, estimated as 
the average schooling attainment of 65-95 cohorts for each of the ethnic groups identified in 
the DHS data. Column 3 shows that the schooling estimate increased slightly, from 19.35 
percent to 18.34. To column 4 we add time dummy. This increased the schooling estimate to 
28.98 percent from 18.34 percent while it is still statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 
Before the UPE programme, government committed considerable resources in physical 
projects, such as network of roads, electricity and dams for irrigation and water supply. A 
considerable fraction of these projects took place the Gowon administration and subsequent 
administrations that implemented the UPE program. These investments could have 
independent effects on wealth or might even after wealth through schooling. We introduce 
infrastructure variable measuring the extent to which respondent is close to water source 
measured in minutes and availability of electricity within the household. Schooling estimate 
dropped modestly to 23.07 percent (column 5) after adding infrastructure variables. 
 
In column 6, we control for the fact that time invariant unobserved state level factors, like 
state policies that permanently created differences in wealth fortune of those resident in them. 
Embedded traditional attitudes and practices at the LGA level may have permanent effects on 
labour market performance. State fixed effects variable is introduced to check the magnitude 
of these factors on observed outcome. We acknowledge the possibility that some time 
invariant factors could work the geopolitical zone, and needed to be accounted for. After 
accounting for time invariant factors at different levels, the schooling coefficient is still 
significant at 1 percent, increasing modestly from 23.07 to 27.56 percent.  
 
Geographic locations, which support higher level of economic activities, could increase 
incentives to participate in the UPE programme because returns to schooling will be much 
higher than those living in geographic location with comparatively lower volume of 
economic activities. There might also be difference in participation in the UPE programme 
because of the topographic features of each location. For instance, some LGAs could have 
highly irregular terrains, making schools more difficulty to reach for relevant cohorts. Apart 
from this, geographic characteristics could have independent effect on wealth or economic 
performance (Nunn and Puga, 2012), violating the exclusion restriction condition. To 
mitigate the potential effect of geographic factors, we introduced LGA altitude to measure the 
topography of the LGA landscape. As shown in column 7, schooling variable remains 
significant at 1 percent, increasing marginally to 30.22 percent. For comparison, we produced 
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Table 5.0 IV Regressions Results 
Panel A: Second Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth)  
Survey Sample NDHS NDHS NDHS NDHS NDHS NDHS NDHS GHS 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Income per 
Hour 
Schooling (years) 0.4355***   
(0.0483) 
0.1935***   
(0.0454) 
0.1834***   
(0.0667) 
0.2898***   
(0.0619) 
0.2307***   
(0.0668) 
0.2756***    
(0.0800) 
0.3022***   
(0.0834) 
1.1343   
(3.2228) 
Panel B: First Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment (Measured in Years)  
UPE_E 0.7317***  
(0.0480) 
0.6430***  
(0.0455) 
0.4395***   
(0.0426) 
0.4770***   
(0.0426) 
0.4286***   
(0.0407) 
0.3608***   
(0.0399) 
0.3485***   
(0.0394) 
0.0337   
(0.0507) 
Observations 127931 126178 125324 125324 125202 125198 124656 45520 
F-Statistics 229.35 12151.63 16509.32 14565.76 14430.39 12220.19 10568.85 0.4400 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic  
219.81 219.20 116.79 137.75 120.17 88.68 84.58 0.41 
Paap-Kleibergen 
F-Statistic 
229.35 199.79 106.60 125.62 111.05 81.81 78.13 0.4400 
MODEL 1 is a bivariate IV regression with schooling attainment the only explanatory variable. Other control variables in  
model 2 included age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy and marital status dummy. Model 3 is model 2 plus ethnic 
 capital. Model 4 is model 3 with time dummy added to it. Model 5 is model 4 plus infrastructure capital (electricity availability  
dummy and time to get to water source). Model 6 is model 5 in addition to LGA fixed effects , geopolitical and state fixed effects.  
Model 7 has all variables included in model 6 in addition to geographic variables (latitude, longitude and altitude). Control  
variables added to column 8 include age age-squared, gender dummy, sector dummy and marital status dummy. Robust standard  
errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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IV results with pooled 2006-2009 GHS datasets and using logarithm of income per hour as 
dependent variable. We obtain a highly imprecise 113 percent, economically large but 
statistically insignificant (column 8). Because of non-random missing income data, UPE 
instrument turn out to be very weak. This raises concern about the consistency of our results 
using GHS datasets. 
 
There are genuine concerns that IV results reported might be due to how our UPE exposure 
instrument is constructed. It is likely alternative UPE instrument might produce radically 
different results. Five other alternative indicators of UPE exposure are constructed to check 
how robust our regression estimates are to alternative specification of UPE exposure variable.  
The first alternative indicator is based on years of exposure to the programme. Those who are 
6 years old in 1976 had five full years of UPE programme. Years of exposure to UPE 
declined by a year as one moves progressively towards the lower limits of 2-6 age bracket. 
The second instrument allows the school entry age to drop to 5 years to account for potential 
underage enrolment and third UPE instrument permit to the school entry age to be 7 years to 
accommodate overage enrolment. The fourth instrument simultaneously allows both 
underage and overage enrolment. The fifth instrument is based on the fact those who are 7-11 
cohorts in 1976 also benefited from the UPE programme though they were already in school 
at the outset of the programme, and a considerable number could have completed basic 
education without the support of the programme. A sizeable percentage may not be able to 
complete basic education without the programme support. Empirical results are shown in 
columns 1-5 appendix 5. In all cases, schooling estimates are slightly or modestly higher than 
IV estimate reported in column 7 Table 5.0 and are significant at 1 percent.  
 
IV estimates reported are unbiased and consistent if the instrument is strong. Weak 
instrument could bias estimate in the same direction as OLS (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 
1996). A number of diagnostic tests does not suggest we are likely to have bias arising from 
instrument weakness. First, in all first IV regressions reported, the UPE instrument is 
positively and significantly correlated with schooling attainment. Compared with the rule-of-
the-thumb value of 10 given by Stock and Yogo (2002), all first-stage F-Statistic reported in 
in this study show that the instrument set is strong. We come to the same conclusion if we use 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  and Paap-Kleibergen F-Statistic. Additional tests of instrument 
strength follow the suggestion offered by Angrist and Pischke (2009). Using maximum 
likelihood IV estimation technique (LIML), which correct bias due to weak instrument yields 
basically the same estimate (column 6 appendix 5). We also use two Jack Knife estimators 
(JIVE) which can outperform LIML estimation technique when the instrument is weak (Poi, 
2006). The two JIVE estimators are almost the same as the estimate reported for the original 
IV technique (Columns 7 and 8 appendix 5). 
 
5.0.2 Checking for Influential Samples & Selective Migration 
We check for the impact of influential samples as we did for our OLS regressions. Thus, we 
progressively drop observations from F.C.T in column 1, Lagos and F.C.T in column 2 and 
South-West in column 3 (appendix 6) using HNLSS data. We repeated the same process with 
DHS datasets (columns 4-6). While schooling coefficients remained significant at 1 percent, 
estimates drop sharply as shown in columns 1-3 when HNLSS is used but remain barely 
unchanged when DHS datasets are used. Results indicate that observations from these rapidly 
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developing regions are not necessarily driving results, with the schooling and wealth 
relationship remaining positive and significant at 1 percent.  
Migration is just one important reason why doubt exists as to whether exclusion restriction 
could be fulfilled. Duflo (2004) identified two sources of sample selection bias. One, there is 
the possibility of selective migration along unobserved characteristics. This occurs if low 
productivity old people moved towards LGAs where the programme was implemented with 
greater intensity or high productivity old people quit living in the low programme intensity 
LGAs. Two, because the programme affected the segment of the sample population for 
whom specific outcomes are observed, the probability of selection in the sample is affected 
by the instruments.  There is a similar possibility of bias if programme beneficiaries move to 
better neighbourhoods after acquiring basic education. The bias is more serious when 
beneficiaries move farther afield, and the sending and receiving regions are fundamentally 
different from each other. This happens when the movement is massively from rural locations 
to thriving urban centres. According to Schultz (1988) and Duflo (2004), selective migration 
might bias coefficients of schooling attainment variable towards zero.  
If selective migration is prevalent, then it is likely that IV estimates will be biased. Selective 
mass migration may undo the effect of the UPE programme (Duflo, 2004). Thus, estimates of 
private or external returns to schooling investment will be incorrect when migration occurs 
(Schultz, 1988). When individuals educated in the rural area move to urban locations due to 
rural–urban wage differentials, wage returns are partly associated with education and 
migration, while returns to schooling in the rural sector is under–estimated. A study in 
Colombia, reported in Schultz (1988) on private returns to schooling discovers substantial 
difference in return to schooling between rural and urban sectors when migration is 
accounted for.  
Though, there is evidence that across the state migration is not of a considerable magnitude to 
affect our schooling estimates (Osili and Long, 2008; Osili 2008; Oyelere, 2010), there are 
still concerns that within state migration might confound schooling estimates from IV 
regressions. Nigerian urbanization literature (Mberu, 2005) has reported a massive increase in 
the number of urban areas in the last three decades. If rural-urban migration within states is 
considerable schooling coefficient estimates will be biased in a model that fails to account for 
selective migration.  
Furthermore, we used the 2009 HNLSS data to provide additional evidence for instrument 
validity. From this data, we simply added migrant dummy to the set of explanatory model 
included in column 7 (appendix 6). If selective migration is important for observed, including 
this variable should pick up the effect, leaving the coefficient of schooling attainment 
insignificant. Including migrant dummy leaves schooling coefficient essentially unaffected. 
Running regression for non-migrant sample produced slightly lower schooling coefficient 
(Column 8). However, the coefficient is still statistically significant. 
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5.0.3 IV Regression Results Robustness to Alternative Survey and Additional Variables 
 
The positive correlation between schooling attainment and wealth status documented in the 
previous regressions is consistent with our expectation that UPE programme augments 
individual schooling attainment, and through schooling, raises individual wealth. Despite the 
fact that UPE instrument could mitigate omitted variable bias, there are concerns that the 
exclusion of some relevant variables may induce spurious relationship between schooling 
attainment and wealth. What is more, we computed wealth variable from 12 listed household 
assets, raising the possibility that higher income families may have greater number of 
household assets not covered in the two DHS surveys. This may bias our schooling 
attainment estimate downward. To preclude biases from these sources, we turn to the 2009 
HNLSS data described previously. HNLSS data have 20 household assets listed as against 12 
in DHS data. 
 
As a first measure, we use produce IV regression using the complete set of covariates used in 
IV regression with DHS datasets. Table 6.0 column 1 reports our result. A year of schooling 
increases wealth by nearly 58 percent. This is more than three times the IV estimate reported 
using DHS dataset.  In column 2, we incorporated three religion dummy variables to account 
for the potential effect that time invariant religious practices could have on wealth 
accumulation directly or indirectly through participation in the government funded UPE 
programme. Introducing these religion dummies increasing schooling coefficient slightly 
59.16 percent and it is significant at 1 percent. 
If UPE increased enrolment that has important consequences for variety of civic activities, 
including membership of political party in a society characterised by pervasive rent-seeking, 
observed wealth outcome might not because UPE beneficiaries performed better than related 
non-beneficiaries in the labour markets did. Rather, it could because UPE cohorts are using 
opportunities available to them in the political markets. While education leads to better labour 
market outcome because it makes people more productive, the experience in some 
developing countries shows public jobs are allocated to politically influential groups (Schultz, 
2004).Reward system in essentially redistributive state is skewed in favour of the groups with 
political influence. In a recent study, Larreguy and Marshall (2013) finds that 1976 UPE has 
influenced a variety of political behaviours, including membership of political party. 
Therefore, it appears that the channel of causation is from UPE programme to increased 
schooling and then to political party membership, and to better wealth outcome. If this is the 
case in Nigeria, then our exclusion restriction condition is violated, and coefficients of 
schooling attainment questionable. To test whether this is responsible for observed outcome, 
dummy variable for political membership is included in our specification. As shown in 
column 3 Panel A, the coefficient of schooling attainment remains statistically significant at 1 
percent. 
 
However, omitted variables correlated with selection into schooling activities and with 
subsequent outcome variable could explain observed outcome. In the seminal study of 
Bowles and Gintis (1976), schooling is not only seen as contributing to labour market 
performance of new entrants by enhancing their cognitive capacity but by preparing people 
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for work place rules, fitting them into hierarchical structure of modern corporation and 
making them function properly in social settings. One other central proposition in their 
human capital theory argues that parents pass onto their children traits, which promote labour 
market success. This theory accounts for the significant great persistence in the 
intergenerational inequality found in a number of empirical studies between parents and 
children’s adult economic status (see survey by Mulligan, 1997). Empirical studies surveyed 
in Mulligan (1997) report high estimates, of intergenerational coefficient, ranging from 0.34 
to 0.68 for variables such as family income, wealth, income and earnings average. 
 
Table 6 : IV REGRESSION RESULTS ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE SURVEY DATA  
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A : Second Stage IV Regression (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth) 
Schooling 
(years) 
0.5797***    
(0.1052) 
0.5916***   
(0.1079) 
0.5690***  
(0.1038) 
0.5681***  
(0.1037) 
0.5659***  
(0.1030) 
0.5658*** 
(0.1049) 
Religion 
Dummies 
No  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Political-
Party 
Dummy 
No No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Parental 
Status 
No No No Yes Yes  Yes  
Koranic 
Education 
Dummy 
No No No No Yes  Yes  
Adult 
Education & 
OJT 
Dummies 
No No No No No Yes  
Panel B: First Stage Regression (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment) 
UPE_E 0.3079***   
(0.0387) 
0.3009***   
(0.0383) 
0.3160***  
(0.0393) 
0.3160***   
(0.0393) 
0.3171*** 
(0.0391) 
0.3119 
(0.0390) 
Observations 139355 139355 131591 131591 131591 131094 
F-Statistics 5222.51 4638.89 4118.41 3876.13 3867.62 3520.56 
Cragg-
Donald 
Wald F 
statistic  
66.09 64.42 67.18 67.17 68.30 66.20 
Paap-
Kleibergen 
F-Statistic 
63.30 61.85 64.53 64.52 65.76 63.90 
Baseline Variables in model 1 include Schooling Years, Age, Age-Squared, sector, gender,  
marital status dummy, infrastructure (railroad, distance to water source, dam dummy),  
ethnic capital, LGA or district FE and terrain ruggedness. Other association measures such as 
 membership of religious, family, professional and other associations yield similar estimates as that 
reported in column 3. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗  
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Unfortunately, the data on parental education and occupational status are essentially available 
for cohorts under the age of 20 years. Alternatively, the study estimate the percentage of 60 
plus cohorts with post-primary education at the enumeration area level. This is what is used a 
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proxy for parental status. There are 10 enumeration areas (EA) in an LGA and 10 households 
in a given EA. This proxy is used based on the assumption that there is high degree of spatial 
segregation according to socio-economic status. Introducing this proxy barely any effect on 
the statistical significance of the coefficient of schooling attainment (column 4 Panel A). 
Unfortunately, the data on parental education and occupational status are essentially available 
for cohorts under the age of 20 years. Alternatively, the study estimate the percentage of 60 
plus cohorts with post-primary education at the enumeration area level. This is what is used a 
proxy for parental status. There are 10 enumeration areas (EA) in an LGA and 10 households 
in a given EA. This proxy is used based on the assumption that there is high degree of spatial 
segregation according to socio-economic status. Introducing this proxy barely any effect on 
the statistical significance of the coefficient of schooling attainment (column 4 Panel A). 
The theoretical framework of Fryer (2007) shows that some ethnic groups tends to make 
certain kind of human capital investment which may facilitate or impede their success in the 
labour market. The theory posits that individual current human capital investment signals an 
intention to remain as part of her ethnic group or a desire to defect. When current investment 
is a litmus test of their loyalty to the group, the amount of schooling investment is dependent 
on whether the ethnic group in question considers schooling as desirable. Where it is 
considered undesirable, individuals are compelled to make investment in activities that are 
unrelated to labour market success. As at the time of independence, when schooling 
attainment in core north of Nigeria was extremely low, there were considerably large number 
of Koranic schools with equally significant enrolment rates. We will be under estimating the 
coefficients of schooling variable if koranic education reduces years of formal education and 
undermines labour market performance. Thus, we include a dummy variable for Koranic 
education in the specification reported in Panel B column 5. Coefficient of schooling 
attainment remain robust to the inclusion of this dummy variable. 
Though coefficients of schooling attainment variable remain consistently significant at 
different specifications, there is a possibility that some other kind of education or skill 
acquisition may be driving outcome. For instance, adult education could be influencing 
wealth status as much as formal basic education acquired during childhood years. Rocha 
(2011) finds that adult education in Brazil increases individual wages by 21.25 percent but 
has negligible effect on individual employability4.Okedara (1985) study of 3-year 
experimental literacy programme in Nigeria indicates a return to adult education of 10.5 
percent.  
 
It is important to note that considerable human capital investment takes place after formal 
schooling has ended (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998). Much of this human capital 
acquisition is in the form of on-the-job training. While age variable captures part of the 
experience gained on the job, there is also the need to account for the potential impact of on-
the-job training on wealth status. Dostie (2013) recent study shows firm-sponsored classroom 
training, enhances worker’s productivity. Accounting for the potential impact of Koranic 
education and on-the-job training on wealth did not affect statistical significance of schooling 
coefficient (Column 5 Panel B).  
 
 
                                                                 
4Schwerdt (2012) randomized field experiment reveals that adult education barely affects wages, employment 
and increased schooling in Switzerland. 
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While the literature is still controversial, school quality has been regarded as an important 
determinant of schooling attainment and labour market performance across developing and 
developed countries (Betts, 1995; Betts, 1996 and Grogger, 1996; Brunello and Checchi, 
2005). If school quality changed after the introduction of the UPE programme, and the 
change is significantly related to current labour market performance, omitting school quality 
variable from the study’s econometric model will violate IV exclusion restriction condition.  
 
If we take into consideration the criticism that many of the school quality indicators used in a 
many studies are input-based, this study follows the approach suggested by Hanushek and co-
researchers (Hanushek, 2003;Hanushek 2005; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek, 
and Woessmann, 2007;Hanushekand Woessmann, 2012). The approach involves using 
outcome-based performance rating in key areas such as reading, writing and quantitative 
skills as school quality indicators. Fortunately, the 2009 HNLSS data do have information on 
respondents’ relative ability to read and write English language and perform simple 
computation without difficulty. This study used these as indicators of school quality5. If 
school quality is important and positively correlated with years of schooling and wealth, 
excluding school quality from our specification will understate the true impact of education 
on wealth status (Wooldridge, 2005).   
 
As a first measure, the study examines the correlation between UPE exposure and ability to 
read, write and implement simple mathematical computation. We use the 2010 National 
Literacy Survey collected by National Bureau of Statistics. From the OLS and probit results 
presented in appendix 7, there is no statistically significant relationship between UPE 
indicator variable and ability to read, write and carry out simple computation. However, a 
positive and statistically significant relationship exist between UPE indicator and each 
measure of ability to read, write and do simple computation when HNLSS data are used 
(columns 1-3 Appendix 8). We use the 2008 National School Census Survey to estimate the 
percentage of schools established during the UPE program as at 1981 at the LGA level. High-
intensity LGAs are those LGAs with values at and above mean and low-intensity LGAs are 
those with values below the mean. If UPE program caused a drop in school quality, schooling 
estimate from IV regression in low-intensity areas should be higher than similar estimate in 
high-intensity areas. However, results in columns 4 and 5 (Appendix 8) shows the wealth 
returns to schooling is 64.7 percent in high-intensity region and 51.2 percent in low-intensity 
area. Finally, we introduce ability to read dummy variable in column 6, dummies for reading 
and writing ability in column 7 and dummies for reading, writing and do simple computation 
in column 8 (appendix 8). Introducing these dummies dramatically increased the coefficients 
of schooling variable, making it less precise than before though still statistically significant at 
1 percent. 
 
6.0 Tackling Additional Instrument Validity Problems 
 
In our reduced form specification, we find a strong positive relationship between the UPE 
instrument and wealth. The first-stage regressions in Tables 5 & 6 indicate positive and 
significant relationship between UPE instrument and endogenous schooling attainment 
variable. First and Second-stage IV regression estimates reported in Panels A and B Tables 5 
& 6 buttress this fact. Our IV identification strategy is reliable to the extent that the schooling 
attainment is the only channel through UPE instrument affects welfare indicator. If this is 
true, then no positive relationship between false UPE instruments and wealth. For the same 
                                                                 
5 These are imprecise indicators of school quality and could as well as an indicator of natural ability. 
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reason, true UPE instrument should not have any positive and significant impact on wealth 
for countries that never implemented the UPE programme at the time Nigeria. If there is, then 
the validity of our true UPE instrument is in doubt. The luck of draw simply favoured our 
instrument as it is unlikely to be valid. It is possible that UPE instrument might simply be 
capturing trends in enrolment rates, without affecting schooling attainment (Oyelere, 2010). 
Bertrand et al (2004) ran placebo regressions with false instruments. They found significant 
impact of placebo interventions. Previously, Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) had shown that 
generating instruments that are random, even they are not relevant, could produce results 
similar to those reported in Angrist and Krueger (1991) that used season of birth and 
compulsory laws as instruments for schooling attainment.  
 
To be sure our instruments were not spurious, we chose two sets of cohorts which were not 
exposed to 1976 UPE program and constructed two placebo UPE instruments for these 
cohorts. They include cohorts born before 1947 and those born within 1958-1964 who could 
not have benefited from regional UPE program. The first cohort UPE is negatively and 
significantly with wealth. The second has positive but statistically insignificant effect on 
wealth. We implemented a second set of placebo regressions. The variation in the 
implementation of UPE across Africa provides the appropriate platform to implement this 
test. Nigeria is probably one of few countries that introduced UPE programme in the mid-
1970. We implemented placebo regressions for a select number of African countries with no 
history of UPE implementation in 1976. The countries include Senegal, Niger and Chad. For 
comparison, we run three OLS regressions for the pooled Nigeria 2008 and 2013 DHS data 
and separately for each year. DHS wealth index is our dependent variable (columns 3-5 
appendix 9). In each specification, UPE indicator is positively and significantly correlated 
wealth index. In columns 6-8 (appendix 9), we report the results for three other African 
countries. There is positive though statistically insignificant relationship between the placebo 
UPE instrument and wealth index for Senegal, Niger and Chad. This suggests that our UPE 
instrument is probably exogenous.  
 
Exposure to UPE should have positive and significant effect on schooling attainment. Since 
the implementation of the programme was at primary level of education, it should at least 
allow credit-constrained pupils to achieve basic education of six years. However, pupils from 
LGAs with high enrolment rates prior to the outset of the programme, who obviously comes 
from wealthier backgrounds, should achieve more years of post-primary education. 
According to Lang and Kropp (1986), those from richer families would want to distinguish 
themselves from credit-constrained pupils by having more than six years of education. Thus, 
there should be a positive and significant relationship between UPE indicator variable and 
dummies for the first six years of primary education. To test this insight, we develop six 
dummies for at least six years of primary, six dummies for at least years of secondary 
education and eleven dummies for at least 11 years of tertiary education. In appendix 10, the 
results of probit regression indicate a positive and significant between UPE indicator variable 
and the probability of completing at least six years of schooling. The contrasting results in 
appendix 11 is a negative and significant relationship between UPE indicator and probability 
of completing six years of secondary education for cohorts exposed to UPE program. Panels 
A and B of appendix 12 show insignificant relationship between UPE indicator and 
probability of ever completing at least the first 11 years of tertiary education. If the UPE 
programme were exogenous, it must affect the distribution of education in the population in a 
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specific way. If we must follow the prediction of standard human capital model, the UPE 
should affect only those below a required level of education (Lleras-Murray, 2002). Thus, the 
positive and significant relationship between UPE indicator variable and years of basic 
education is indicative of the fact the intervention might be exogenous. 
Another important complication is that the state of the economy affects the demand and 
supply of education. The state can expand the supply of educational services during period of 
rapid economic growth and reduce supply when there is a downturn. For the same reason, 
demand for education by the households and individuals could be high during periods of 
rapid economic growth and low during downturns. Similarly, rapidly growingly economies 
will have more resources to finance education, particularly during boom periods. Thus, IV 
approach will produce biased results if UPE was introduced because the economy was 
growing rapidly and stopped because of a downturn.  
Some have expressed the role oil wealth played in the initiation and spread of the UPE 
programme in Nigeria. The wealth from Nigeria’s petroleum in the 1970s provided the 
country with considerable resources to carry out its UPE plan on a national scale (Bray, 
1981). Rising life expectancy and drastic reduction in child mortality might also spur greater 
demand for education. Rational individuals, in the absence of constraints, might invest 
optimally in human capital when the reward for their investment will not be appropriated by 
the state. This occurs when the institutional environment will preclude political leaders from 
appropriating public resources for private use.  
To provide additional evidence of instrument validity, we run a set of regressions that 
incorporate aggregate data into DHS data. We determined the year individuals in our sample 
reached the age of 6 years, the official school entry age as at 1976. Separately, we introduce 
annual real price of crude oil, under-5 mortality rate, life-expectancy, GDP growth rate, 
government as percentage of GDP, trade openness, exports as percentage of GDP and 
institutional quality in columns 2-10 (appendix 13). Column 1 reproduces IV regression 
reported in column 7 Table 5.0. IV coefficients remain significant at 1 percent, though they 
are less precisely estimated than before.   
The macroeconomic and institutional environments at the time of labour market entry might 
also matter for observed wealth. Without information on the age of labour market entry for 
individuals, we assumed a labour market entry (LME) age of twenty years. We then 
introduced the same set of aggregate variables for the year individuals in our sample was 20 
years. The reported results in appendix 14 shows that schooling estimates remain significant, 
though they are now less precisely estimated.  We obtain similar results when LME is varied 
within 15-25 years. We also checked that entrance into the labour market before or after 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was responsible for observed outcome. SAP is a 
policy packaged introduced in 1986 by the Federal Government of Nigeria after the economic 
collapse of the 1980s. Assuming labour market entry age of between 15 and 25 years, we 
construct dummies, assigning 1 to those enjoined before 1986 when the market fairly 
favourable and zero to others when market situation had grown worse. As seen in columns 1-
10 (appendix 15), schooling coefficients remain significant at 1 percent.  
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IV regressions often rely on the strong assumption that instruments are perfectly exogenous. 
However, this assumption is not likely to hold in reality. However, the question is what is the 
permissible limit of correlation between instrument and unobserved factors in the error term, 
which does not undermine confidence in the unbiasedness and consistency of the estimates of 
our key independent variable of interest? To determine the robustness of our IV estimates, we 
assume some correlation between our instruments and the error term so that we know the 
upper and lower limits of estimates.  
To implement this strategy, we follow the suggestion of Conley, Hansen and Possi (2012) 
that allows the instrument to be incorporated into the second-stage regression of IV 
regression model. Their strategy accepts plausible rather perfect exogeneity, and implements 
econometric strategy under assumption of less than perfect correlation between instrument 
and the unobservables in the error term. Instrument of UPE exposure was incorporated into 
the second stage of the IV regression model, we can determine if the coefficient of schooling 
will include a value of zero for a specified confidence interval. We use the Union of 
Confidence Interval (UCI) and the much stricter Lower to Zero (LTZ) approach. In the UCI 
approach, coefficients of instrument in the reduced form regression are allowed to assume 
values of 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001 at 95 percent confidence interval. As shown in appendix 16 
(columns 1-3), our original IV estimate falls within the lower and upper limits of schooling 
variable reported. The LTZ approach produces similar results (column 4-6). Relaxing the 
assumption of perfect exclusion restrictions by allowing coefficients of instrument to be non-
zero did not affect the estimate of schooling variable. Thus, IV results are still reliable. The 
mere fact that the coefficient obtained after accounting for imperfect orthogonality between 
UPE instrument and error term lies within acceptable intervals suggests that our instrument is 
plausibly exogenous. 
Finally, we use one of the alternative measures of UPE instrument. The chosen UPE 
instrument is built on the assumption that school entry age is 5 years. This is allows us to 
implement formal test of over-identification test. This way, we can establish that our 
instrument is exogenous. This approach is useful because it is a direct test of exclusion 
restriction (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Column 7 reveals that schooling 
coefficient is comparable to estimate before now. This coefficient is also statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Result of overidentification test shows that our instruments are 
exogenous. Over-identification tests reinforce confidence in near exogeneity of chosen 
instruments. In the specifications reported in the last row of column 7, our results fail to reject 
the exclusion restriction condition by a wide margin. While this test is not definitive on the 
question of validity, it is at least assuring when taken alongside the results of other tests. 
7.0 Comparison with Other Results. 
Early studies used Net Present Value (NPV) approach in estimating benefits of private 
benefits of schooling. Psacharopoulos (1972) carried out a review of initial studies, indicating 
the benefits of students fall with rising level of education. In Nigeria, a serious attempt at 
deriving estimates of returns to education most likely started with Bowles (1965, 1967 and 
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1969) who restricted his interest to the Northern part of Nigeria6. Using the NPV approach, 
he asserts that the educational sector has a strong claim on economic resources and efficient 
allocation of resources within the educational system requires the expansion of primary 
education and a corresponding reduction in technical and secondary school education. In 
general, Bowles concluded that inadequate resources are devoted to education in Northern 
Nigeria. A similar estimation technique was used by Okedara (1985)7, who studied the 
impact of three-year experimental adult literacy programme of the University of Ibadan on 
labour market performance in comparison with returns from formal schooling. The study 
reported 10.6 percent private returns to formal primary education.  
Psacharoupoulos (1994)8 reported OLS estimates of returns to primary, secondary and higher 
education of 23, 12.8 and 17.0 percent respectively based on a 1966 pre-tax survey data 
gathered from Western Nigeria. For Mid-Western Nigeria, Akangbou (1977) obtained OLS 
estimates of 13.4 percent for lower secondary school, 11.9 percent for vocational secondary, 
11.2 percent for upper secondary school and 17.2 percent for university education. In a study 
by Fajana (1975), the vast inter-industry wage differential was attributed to economic and 
institutional factors. While high level of productivity in large-scale industrial outfit may 
partly account for the differentials, capital intensity of production and organized labour 
activities also significantly influence the wage differentials. Aromolaran (2004, 2006) who 
applied the OLS technique to the Mincer model obtained returns of between 2-4 percent for 
primary and secondary education and between 10-15 percent for tertiary education for 
between GHS covering 1997-1999. Okpako and Osakwe (1986) exploited the variation in the 
costs of schooling through the differences between mean expenditures, found the private 
internal rate of return to training as a nurse in Nigeria to be 146 percent.  
In an exclusive study of manufacturing workers and firms in Nigeria, Soderbom and Teal 
(2002) report significantly high returns to schooling, experience and skill for this category of 
workers. The returns to schooling increases with rising years of schooling and with increasing 
size of firms. The second survey of the same sector produced similar results (Malik, Teal and 
Baptist, 2006). Though mainly interested in private returns to higher education, Okuwa 
(2004) also applied the OLS technique to the Mincer model and reported returns to extra year 
of schooling of 1.6% for secondary education, 12.7% for National Certificate of Education 
(NCE), 10.7% for polytechnics and 16.7% for university. Thus, contrary to the claims of 
Psacharoupoulos (1985, 1994 & 2004) for sub-Saharan Africa in general and Nigeria in 
particular, both studies showed that returns to education rise with the educational ladder. 
Note that both Aromolaran and Okuwa estimates could have under or over estimated returns 
to education because data constraint did not allow them to correct for self-selection bias. 
Amaghionyeodiwe and Osinubi (2007) report that schooling attainment and job experience 
are positively and significantly correlated with earnings. They report greater returns to 
schooling for those with higher education. 
However, omitted variable bias due to unobserved ability remains controversial in estimating 
returns to education.  Added to these are biases sue to endogeneity and measurement error. 
Because of the of endemic problems of schooling endogeneity and measurement error often 
associated with OLS econometric technique used in the studies reviewed by Psacharopoulos, 
more recent works are now being complemented by more modern and sophisticated 
econometric estimation techniques (Card, 1999). Now widely used is the Instrumental 
                                                                 
6
 Bowles, Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, sent me a copy of the first article published from his 1965 
Harvard PhD thesis in Economics and sent the tit le of the book which grew from his PhD work as well.  
7
 This approach is flawed to the extent earnings reported as benefits may not be due to education.  
8
 Reported in Psacharopoulos (1985) and then in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).  
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Variable (IV) approach.9 The IV approach approximates randomized trial carried out in a 
natural experiment by natural scientists. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) acknowledge 
the increasing use of IV technique in the estimation of returns to education. In about half the 
number of cases, IV technique has not yielded estimates significantly higher than OLS 
estimates. In half the remaining studies, IV estimates have proved to be considerably higher 
than OLS estimates. This is probably because measurement error and omitted variables bias 
OLS estimates downward than endogeneity tend to raise these estimates. 
A number of studies have used this IV technique in deriving the returns to education 
estimates, exploiting one natural experiments of nature10 or change of government policy11. 
Card (1993) uses closeness of location of residence to college as an instrument for schooling. 
Butcher and Case (1994) argue that sibling sex composition is a good instrument for 
schooling because women without sisters have higher educational attainment than those with 
sisters. Harmon and Walker (1995) employ the quarter of birth and dummies connected to 
increases in compulsory schooling age. Angrist (1991), interested in measuring the long-term 
labour market consequences of military service, uses randomly assigned draft-lottery 
numbers as a suitable instrument. Angrist and Krueger (1991) adopt the season of birth as 
instrument because it is correlated with educational attainment due to age at the start of 
schooling and compulsory school attendance laws. The reasoning is that individuals born at 
the onset of one year begins school at an older age relative to those born later in the year. 
Thus, those born in the early part of the year have lesser school attainment than those born in 
the latter part of the year12.  
To correct for biases due to OLS technique, Oyelere (2010) used the IV technique employing 
similar datasets used by Aromolaran (2004, 2006) to derive estimates of between 3-3.6 
percent for average year of education in Nigeria13. Though both Oyelere and Aromolaran 
report estimates that quantitatively similar, nevertheless Oyelere’s upper limit of 3.6 percent 
against an upper limit of 15% in Aromolaran paper is particularly startling14. Oyelere’s 
explanation for the low returns is that poor economic condition.  
Though the use of IV technique represents an improvement over the use of OLS method. 
However, using wages as an outcome indicator in a developing country like Nigeria may 
have some complications. Therefore, the study used consumer durables as indicator of labour 
market performance, skipping the need to use income, which is often misreported and may be 
affected by short run fluctuations in economic activities. The few studies using the IV 
technique to evaluate UPE programme have not established a convincing case for 
instrument(s) exogeneity. The tendency is to assume perfect zero correlation between 
instrument and error term. Therefore, this study takes full advantage of the recent 
advancement in the studies of testing for IV exogeneity condition to establish the fact that 
UPE instruments are approximately exogenous. Thus, the returns to wealth reported for UPE 
beneficiaries in this study are higher than those reported in previous studies.  The difference 
is not just because of differences in estimating technique and choice of data, but also because 
the returns reported here is exclusively for UPE beneficiaries. It is for this reason that we are 
                                                                 
9
 To some extent, matching methods, control function methods, semi parametric estimations and non parametric estimation techniques are 
also being used. 
10
 Examples include sibling-sex composition, proximity to college location, occurrence of twin births, quarter of birth etc.  
11
 Examples include State laws, compulsory schooling laws, smoking, maximum class size rule, and discontinuities in financial aid formula 
among others. 
12
 See Angrist and Krueger (2001:82) for a list  of instruments used in empirical studies and detailed explanation of IV technique.  
13
 She added more control variables than Aromolaran (2004) did. Control variables in her work included cohort, sex and location in addition 
to the fact that she used age and age squared in places of experience and experience squared to minimize measurement error an d possible 
endogeneity of experience. An updated version of the same paper (Oyelere, 2009) reduced the estimate to 2.9%. 
14
 Most of the result encountered usually report higher estimates for IV technique than for OLS method. See Girma and Kedir (200 5) for 
another exception to the rule. 
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unable to compare OLS and IV estimates. To implement formal test of overidentification, we 
use one of the alternative instruments built on the assumption that the school entry age is five 
years.  
8. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this study attempt to estimate the impact of schooling attainment on an important indicator 
of labour market performance: wealth. OLS and IV regressions produced economically and 
statistically significant estimates, with OLS estimate of about 18 percent and IV estimate of 
about 30 percent when pooled DHS is used and about 56 percent when HNLSS data are 
employed. We have no evidence that OLS estimates are an artefact of the way the dependent 
variable is constructed or influential observations are driving observed outcome. In our IV 
regression specification, econometric tests prove that instrument is strong. Indicative and 
formal tests of instrument validity such as addition of new relevant variables, falsification 
tests, plausibly exogenous test and over-identification test are proofs of instrument validity. A 
number of econometric strategies implemented indicate that influential observations and 
selective migration are not biasing our results.  
 
While wealth as a proxy for individual wellbeing comes with its own limitations, a number of 
checks on this proxy justify its appropriateness in this context. One caveat to our results lies 
in our inability to instrument for explanatory variables such as migration, Koranic education, 
adult education and on-the-job training, which are obviously endogenous. According to 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), this could bias the estimates of our schooling attainment 
variable. However, we instrument for each of these endogenous variable one after the other.  
 
Generally, the central contribution of this paper is to add to the ongoing effort at evaluating 
the 1976 UPE programme. Before now, rigorous econometric evaluation of the programme 
has not been implemented. The initial attempt at evaluating this programme effect on female 
schooling, child mortality and fertility has produced controversial results (Osili and Long, 
2008: Osili, 2008: Palmer-Jones, 2008; Maret, 2012). Oyelere (2010) did not specifically 
evaluate the 1976 UPE programme, but used all UPE programmes implemented before and 
after political independence of Nigeria and 1976 UPE programme as instrument for schooling 
attainment. While the collective impact of the programme is substantial in terms of raising 
schooling attainment, it is small in terms of overall effects on individual income. From 
Oyelere study, we cannot determine the individual effects of all UPE programmes on 
schooling attainment and income. Thus, her study was in no way an evaluation of the UPE 
programme, but rather an attempt to use all UPE programmes to construct a valid instrument 
useful in resolving the identification problems associated with studies trying to derive causal 
estimates. It is at least fair to conclude that all things being equal, large-scale public sector 
investment in schooling is capable of increasing the wealth of Nigerian residents 
considerably. 
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Appendix 1: Unit Cost of Household Items in Naira 
SN ITEMS COSTS (N) SN ITEMS COSTS (N) 
1 Bicycle 14588.24 19 Mattress 16759 
2 CARS/VEHICLES 458272 20 Microwave 7750 
3 Cassette recorder 3145.45 21 Mobile Phone 7023 
4 Computer 57428.57 22 telephone 10000 
5 DVD Player 5129.1 23 Motorbike 67159 
6 Electric Clothes Dryer  24 Musical Instrument 5367 
7 Fan 3858.1 25 Others (specify) 31220 
8 Freezer 72071.43 26 Radio 3450 
9 Fridge 53538.46 27 Satellite Dish 17325 
10 Furniture (3/4 piece sofa set) 59179 28 Sewing machine 12170 
11 Furniture (chairs) 16387 29 Stove (electric) 2500 
12 Furniture (table) 6292 30 Stove (kerosene) 3861 
13 Gas cooker 20000 31 Stove gas (table) 12500 
14 Generator 126790 32 TV Set 16397 
15 Hi-Fi (Sound System) 8500 33 Washing Machine 60000 
16 Inverter 7089 34 Mattress 16759 
17 Iron 8056 35 Microwave 7750 
18 Mat 1488 36 Mobile Phone 7023 
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2010. 
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Appendix 2: OLS Regressions 
Variables/column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Data Sample 2006 
GHS 
2007  
GHS 
2008 
GHS 
2009 
GHS 
2008 
DHS 
2013 
DHS 
Schooling (years) 0.0019***  
(0.0001) 
0.0291***   
(0.0032) 
0.0417***    
(0.0015) 
0.1200   
(0.0813) 
0.2198***   
(0.003) 
0.1904***   
(0.0023) 
Age & Age-Squared Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Gender Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household Size &  
Household Size  
Squared 
No No No No Yes  Yes  
Marital status 
dummy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ethnic Capital No No No No Yes  Yes  
Time-Dummy No No No No No No 
Observations 10924 14052 17124 3420 62195 72553 
F-Statistics 79.19 35.61 304.37 1.70 2008.02 1913.18 
R-Squared 0.0412 0.0146 0.0961 0.0012 0.1958 0.2000 
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Controlling For More Variables  (OLS Regressions) 
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Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth 
Variables/column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Data Sample 2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
2008 & 
2013 DHS 
2008 & 
2013 
DHS 
Schooling (years) 0.2022***    
(0.0018) 
0.1942***   
(0.0019) 
0.2039***   
(0.0018) 
0.1933***   
(0.0019) 
0.1929***   
(0.0019) 
0.1919*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1895***   
(0.0019) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geopolitical Region Fixed Effects. Yes  No No Yes  No No No 
State Fixed Effects No Yes  No Yes  No No No 
LGA F.E No No Yes  Yes  No No No 
Latitude  No No No No Yes  No No 
Longitude No No No No No Yes  No 
Altitude No No No No No Yes  Yes  
Observations 134748 134748 134748 134748 134748 134748 134748 
F-Statistics 3423.63 3435.73 3432.46 2921.95 2719.43 2588.59 2432.38 
R-Squared 0.2093 0.2116 0.2105 0.2137 0.2138 0.2198 0.2210 
Other control variables include age, age -squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, household size, household size squared,  
marital status dummy, ethnic capital and time dummy. To column 4 we add variables measuring geo-political region,  
state & LGA Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,  
and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 4: More Robustness Tests  (OLS Regressions) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth 
Variables/column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Data Sample Male 
Sample 
Female 
Sample  
Urban 
Sample  
Rural 
Sample  
Drop SW 
Observations 
Drop Lagos 
Observations 
Drop Abuja 
Observations 
Schooling (years) 0.178***   
(0.0025) 
0.2087***   
(0.00284) 
0.1763***   
(0.0023) 
0.1972***   
(0.0028) 
0.1924***   
(0.0021) 
0.1922***    
(0.0019) 
0.1864***   
(0.0019) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65616 69129 49109 85639 112343 129151 131486 
F-Statistics 1221.21 1401.14 514.22 1107.32 1997.53 2271.85 2323.48 
R-Squared 0.2257 0.2213 0.1935 0.1555 0.2096 0.2126 0.2163 
Other control variables include age, age -squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, household size, household size squared,  
marital status dummy, ethnic capital and time dummy, fixed effects for geo-political region, state, LGA, LGA Latitude,  
LGA Longitude and LGA Ruggedness index. Dropping each of the other state one at time has not affected the statistical  
significance of the schooling coefficients. Similarly, imple menting OLS regressions for each of the 36 states and Federal  
Capital Territory (F.C.T) produced coefficients  of schooling variables that are statistically significant at 1 percent.  
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 5: Robustness to Alternative Measures of UPE Instrument Exposure Dummy & Instrument Strength Test 
Variables/column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Using 
Years of 
Exposure 
Allowing 
School 
Entry Age 
To Be 5 
Years 
Allowing 
School 
Entry To 
7 Years 
Overage 
And 
Underage 
(5 & 7 
Years) As 
School 
Entry 
Age  
Using All 
UPE 
Beneficiaries 
To 
Construct 
UPE 
Exposure 
Dummy 
IV 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimator 
To Check 
For Weak 
Instrument 
UJIVE 1 UJIVE 2 
Panel A Dependent 
Variable: 
Log of 
Wealth 
       
Schooling (years) 0.3015***  
(0.0633) 
0.3268*** 
(0.0715) 
0.2805***   
(0.0632) 
0.3030***  
(0.0567) 
0.3416***   
(0.0491) 
0.3022***   
(0.0834) 
0.3465***  
(0.1104) 
0.3453***   
(0.1091) 
Other control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Dependent 
Variable: 
Schooling 
Attainment 
       
UPE_E 0.1445***  
(0.0128) 
0.3819***   
(0.0370) 
0.4438***   
(0.0384) 
0.4677***    
(0.0362) 
0.5294***   
(0.0335) 
0.3485***    
(0.0394) 
NA NA 
Observations 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 
F-Statistics 10582.00 10580.86 10585.29 10598.80 10633.36 10568.85 2071.96 2073.63 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic  
141.54 115.22 145.49 180.93 270.71 NA NA NA 
Paap-Kleibergen 
F-Statistic 
126.45 106.80 133.35 166.57 249.20 NA NA NA 
Other control variables include age, age -squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, household size, household size squared,  
marital status dummy, ethnic capital and time dummy, fixed effects for geo-political region, state, LGA, LGA Latitude,  
LGA Longitude and LGA altitude. NA is not applicable. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate  
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 6: IV Regression Results Robustness to Influential Observations & Selective Migration 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Survey HNLSS HNLSS  HNLSS  NDHS  NDHS  NDHS  HNLSS  HNLSS  
Panel A: Dependent Variable: 
Log of Wealth 
Drop FCT 
Obs. 
Drop 
Lagos & 
FCT 
Drop 
South 
West 
Drop FCT 
Obs. 
Drop 
Lagos & 
FCT 
Drop 
South 
West 
Selective 
Migration. 
Non-
Migrant 
Sample 
Schooling (years) 0.1836***    
(0.0590) 
0.1851***   
(0.0637) 
0.1800**    
(0.0715) 
0.3073***    
(0.0859) 
0.3064***   
(0.0923)   
0.2905***   
(0.0958) 
0.6070***   
(0.1240)   
0.5939***   
(0.139)   
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Migrant Dummy No No No No No No Yes No 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: 
Schooling Years 
        
UPE_E 0.4860***    
(0.0406) 
0.4725***   
(0.0419) 
0.4495***   
(0.0450) 
0.3464***   
(0.0397) 
0.3374***   
(0.0409) 
0.3444***  
(0.0436)   
0.3290***   
(0.0479) 
0.3366*** 
(0.0542) 
Observations 131355 125770 112237 121398 116464 105616 88845 68261 
F-Statistics 11522.59 10395.19 8758.96 10270.03 9371.38 8226.12 2376.79 1778.61 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  152.91 136.562 108.894 82.61 74.24 68.45 49.00 40.33 
Paap-Kleibergen F-Statistic 143.17 126.971 99.963 76.23 68.21 62.54 47.21 38.53 
Baseline Variables in model 1 include Schooling Years, Age, Age-Squared, sector, gender, marital status dummy, infrastructure (railroad,  
distance to water source, dam dummy), ethnic capital, LGA or district FE and terrain ruggedness, three dummy variable for religion (other  
religion as base dummy), political party dummy, parental status, Koranic education dummy, adult education dummy, and on-the-job training dummy. 
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 7: Checking for School Quality & Ability-(2010 NATIONAL LITERACY SURVEY) 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A: 2010 National 
Literacy Survey 
      
Regression Technique Ordered 
Probit 
OLS Ordered 
Probit 
OLS Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Dependent Variables E4 E4 E5 E5 E8B E8B 
UPE_E -0.00411  
(0.0530) 
0.0064   
(0.0109) 
0.0357   
(0.0528) 
0.0162   
(0.0116) 
0.0258  
(0.0448) 
-0.0027   
(0.0110) 
Other Controls Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 8980 8980 8975 8975 9405 9405 
Wald chi2(11)/F-Statistics 981.48 103.95 1116.46 101.30 1746.50 28.36 
Pseudo R2/R-Squared 0.1917 0.1484 0.1930 0.1543 0.0811 0.0425 
For Panel A other control variables include Highest Schooling attainment, Sector dummy, Sex dummy, Age, Age-Squared Marital Status, Christian 
dummy, Muslim dummy, Traditional religion dummy (Others are base dummy) (AGE RANGE 22-49 IN THE SAMPLE). Robust standard errors are 
expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
E4 = ENGLISH LANG READING ABILITY (READ SMOOTHLY=3: READ WITH DIFFICULTY =2 CANNOT READ=1) 
E5 = ENGLISH LANG WRITING ABILITY (WRITE SMOOTHLY=3: WRITE WITH DIFFICULTY =2 CANNOT WRITE=1)  
E8B= COMPUTATION ABILITY (CANT IDENTIFY FIGURE=1 : IDENTIFY FIGURE ONLY=2: DO COMPUTATION=3). 
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Appendix 8: Checking for School Quality Using 2009 Harmonized National Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) 
Model   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Regression Technique Probit Probit Probit IV IV IV IV IV 
Dependent Variables Read Write  Computation Log of 
Wealth 
(High 
Intensity 
LGA 
sample) 
Log of 
Wealth 
(Low 
Intensity 
LGA 
sample) 
Log of 
Wealth  
Log of 
Wealth  
Log of 
Wealth  
UPE_E 0.0528***   
(0.0149) 
0.0512***   
(0.0145) 
0.0530***   
(0.0133) 
------- ---------- -------- ------- ---------- 
Schooling Years NA NA NA 0.6467***   
(0.1516) 
0.5117**   
(0.2193) 
1.3108***   
(0.1917) 
1.362***   
(0.2035) 
1.488***  
(0.2363) 
Read Dummy No No No No No Yes Yes Yes  
Write Dummy No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Computation Dummy No No No No No No No Yes 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
Observations 153221 153221 153221 43066 45779 88845 88845 88845 
Wald chi2(11)/F-
Statistics 
41585.07 49704.79 49053.34 448.10 903.85 9807.45 9800.84 9857.58 
Pseudo R2/R-Squared 0.6309 0.6038 0.5341 ------- ---------- -------- ------- ---------- 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
   44.79 11.12 72.35 69.03 58.60 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald 
rk  
F-Statistic 
   41.52 11.05 67.32 64.10 54.44 
The control variables are schooling attainment,  age, age-squared, gender dummy,  sector  dummy, marital status dummy,  LGA fixed effects, LGA 
rail dummy,  state dam dummy,   ethnic capital, LGA terrain  ruggedness, Christian dummy, Muslim dummy, traditional religion dummy,    koranic 
education dummy,  adult education dummy and on-the-job training dummy. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Read = English Lang Reading Ability (can read smoothly=1: otherwise zero) 
Write = English Lang Writing Ability (can write smoothly=1: otherwise zero) 
Computation= Computation Ability (can do computation=1, otherwise zero) 
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Appendix 9: Falsification Tests Results (2008 & 2013 Demographic & Health Surveys) 
Model   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Survey (COHORTS 
BORN ON 
OR 
BEFORE 
1947) 
 (USING 
COHORTS 
1958-1964) 
NIGERIA 
NDHS 
 
2008 
NDHS 
2013 NDHS 2005 & 
2011 
Senegal 
DHS 
2006 & 
2012 Niger 
DHS 
2004 
CHAD 
DHS 
Dependent Variables Log of 
Wealth 
Log of 
Wealth 
Wealth Index Wealth 
Index 
Wealth 
Index 
Wealth 
Index 
Log of 
Wealth  
Log of 
Wealth  
UPE_F -1.5280***   
(0.0380) 
0.0167   
(0.0295) 
---------- ------- ---------- -------- ------- ---------- 
UPE_E ---------- ---------- 4567.4*** 
(709.9) 
7004.1***   
(1010.4) 
1965.9**   
(1004.6) 
768.98   
(1491.7) 
828.13 
(1189.9) 
394.4  
(2203.7) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 136533 136533 140135 64955 75180 30681 40394 29132 
F-Statistics 3354.45 3138.35 10812.75 5719.97 6917.66 3363.26 7512.24 4866.33 
R-Squared 0.1973 0.1829 0.3507 0.3457 0.3557 0.4341 0.5273 0.4551 
Regressions reported in columns 1-2 contain the complete of covariates employed in the  regression in column 7 Table 2.0. The control variables used 
in regressions shown in column 3-8 include schooling attainment, age, age-squared, gender dummy, sector dummy, marital status dummy.  Robust 
standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 10: Probit Regression Results (2008 & 2013 Demographic & Health Survey) 
Model   1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable  Pry 1 Pry 2 Pry 3 Pry 4 Pry 5 Pry 6 
UPE_E 0.1671***   
(0.0126) 
0.1677***  
(0.0126) 
0.1705*** 
(0.0126)     
0.1686***   
(0.0125) 
0.1702***  
(0.0124) 
0.1506***  
(0.0123) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 
Wald chi2(10) 32286.76 32297.50 32329.08 31969.62 31772.39 31452.46 
Pseudo R2 0.2762 0.2770 0.2775 0.2724 0.2693 0.2638 
The dependent variables (Pry 1-6) are dummy variables expressed as at least 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 years of primary  
schooling. For columns 1 and 2, control variables include gender dummy,  s ector dummy,  marital status dummy,   
ethnic capital,  time dummy time to reach water source in minutes, electricity available dummy, LGA fixed effects  
 and  LGA altitude. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 10: Probit Regression Results (2008 & 2013 Demographic & Health Survey) 
Model   1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable  Pry 1 Pry 2 Pry 3 Pry 4 Pry 5 Pry 6 
UPE_E 0.1671***   
(0.0126) 
0.1677***  
(0.0126) 
0.1705*** 
(0.0126)     
0.1686***   
(0.0125) 
0.1702***  
(0.0124) 
0.1506***  
(0.0123) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 
Wald chi2(10) 32286.76 32297.50 32329.08 31969.62 31772.39 31452.46 
Pseudo R2 0.2762 0.2770 0.2775 0.2724 0.2693 0.2638 
The dependent variables (Pry 1-6) are dummy variables expressed as at least 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 years of primary  
schooling. For columns 1 and 2, control variables include gender dummy,  sector dummy,  marital status dummy,   
ethnic capital,  time dummy time to reach water source in minutes, electricity available dummy, LGA fixed  
effects and  LGA altitude. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the  
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 11: Probit Regression Results (2008 & 2013 Demographic & Health Survey) 
Model   1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable  Sec 1 Sec 2 Sec 3 Sec 4 Sec 5 Sec 6 
UPE_E -0.0687***   
(0.01197) 
-0.0658***   
(0.0120) 
-0.0539***   
(0.0121) 
-0.0548***   
(0.0122) 
-0.0528***   
(0.0122) 
-0.0333***    
(0.0142) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 
Wald chi2(10) 28735.40 28280.16 27126.87 26619.69 25547.67 10334.59 
R-Squared 0.2335 0.2271 0.2144 0.2089 0.1984 0.0986 
The dependent variables (Sec 1-6) are dummy variables expressed as at least 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 years of secondary  
schooling. Control variables include gender dummy,  sector dummy,  marital status dummy,  ethnic capital,   
time dummy time to reach nearest water source in minutes, electricity available dummy, LGA fixed effects and   
LGA altitude. Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 12:  Probit Regression Results (2008 & 2013 Demographic & Health Survey) 
Panel A        
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable  Ter1 Ter 2 Ter 3 Ter 4 Ter 5 Ter 6 
UPE_E -0.0311**   
(0.0143) 
-0.0464***   
(0.0151) 
-0.0619***  
(0.0169) 
-0.0142   
(0.0244) 
0.0075  
(0.0277) 
0.0230 
(0.0311) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182 
Wald chi2(10) 9222.29 6243.25 4484.07 1117.45 1055.06  
R-Squared 0.0920 0.0748 0.0760 0.0373 0.0432  
Panel B        
Dependent Variable  Ter7 Ter 8 Ter 9 Ter 10 Ter 11  
UPE_E 0.0348  
(0.0326) 
0.0421  
(0.0332) 
0.0398   
(0.0333) 
0.0394  
(0.0333) 
0.0392   
(0.0333) 
 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 139182 139182 139182 139182 139182  
Wald chi2(10) 1239.26 1270.19 1274.70 1274.44 1273.03  
R-Squared 0.0641 0.0671 0.0678 0.0678 0.0677  
The dependent variables (Ter 1-11) are dummy variables expressed as at least 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 years  
of tertiary schooling. Control variables include gender dummy, sector dummy, marital status dummy, ethnic capital,  
time dummy time to reach water source in minutes, electricity available dummy, LGA fixed effects and LGA altitude.  
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Appendix 13: IV Regressions Results Controlling For Macroeconomic Conditions When Individuals Was Age 6 
(2008 & 2013 Nigerian Demographic & Health Survey Data) 
           
Panel A: Second Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth)    
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Schooling 
(years) 
0.3022***  
(0.0834) 
0.3593***   
(0.1324) 
0.4229***   
(0.1427) 
0.3851***   
(0.1464) 
0.4422***   
(0.1402) 
0.5681***   
(0.1974) 
0.3177***   
(0.1252) 
0.4212***  
(0.1334) 
0.4083***   
(01458) 
0.4157***   
(0.1436) 
Other 
Controls 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro-
variable 
added 
(annual) 
None Crude Oil 
Price 
Under 5 
Morality 
Rate 
Life 
Expectancy 
Annual 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Govt Expd 
As %  of 
GDP 
Trade 
Openness 
Inflation Exports 
As %  of 
GDP 
Institution 
Panel B: First Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment (Measured in Years)    
UPE_E 0.3485***    
(0.0394) 
0.2172***   
(0.0386) 
0.2029***   
(0.0381) 
0.1957***  
(0.0381) 
0.2138***   
(0.0391) 
0.1735***   
(0.0419) 
0.2461***  
(0.0427) 
0.2174***   
(0.0383) 
0.2404***  
(0.0467) 
0.2011***  
(0.0381) 
Observations 124656 109258 105993 105993 105993 105993 105993 105993 105993 105993 
F-Statistics 11997.52 8529.94 7926.00 7925.27 7924.21 7924.15 7923.38 7922.23 7924.42 7929.87 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F 
statistic  
 
84.585 
 
34.07 30.11 27.20 31.96 18.34 35.71 38.03 28.40 29.56 
Paap-
Kleibergen F-
Statistic 
78.132 31.94 28.34 25.83 29.97 17.14 33.26 36.27 26.48 27.84 
Other control variables include age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, marital status dummy, ethnic capital, time dummy, infrastructure 
capital (electricity availability dummy and time to get to water source), LGA fixed effects, geopolitical and state fixed effects ,  and geographic 
variables (latitude, longitude and altitude). Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 
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Appendix 14: IV Regressions Results Controlling For Macroeconomic Conditions When Individuals  Was Age 20 
(From Pooled 2008 & 2013 Nigerian Demographic & Health Survey Data) 
           
Panel A: Second Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth)    
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Schooling 
(years) 
0.3022***  
(0.0834) 
0.3488***  
(0.0953) 
0.4233***   
(0.1158) 
0.3805***   
(0.1112) 
0.5415***  
(0.1309) 
0.3804***  
(0.1175) 
0.3836***   
(0.1318) 
0.4235***    
(0.1420) 
0.3898***  
(0.1167) 
0.5687***  
(0.1414) 
Other 
Controls 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro-
variable 
added 
(annual) 
None Crude Oil 
Price 
Under 5 
Morality 
Rate 
Life 
Expectancy 
Annual 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Govt Expd 
As %  of 
GDP 
Trade 
Openness 
Inflation Exports 
As %  of 
GDP 
Institution 
Panel B: First Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment (Measured in Years)    
UPE_E 0.3485***    
(0.0394) 
0.2861***   
(0.0357) 
0.2466***   
(0.0369) 
0.2504***   
(0.0363) 
0.2486***   
(0.0383) 
0.2423***   
(0.0367) 
0.2161***    
(0.0371) 
0.2097***   
(0.0385) 
0.2414*** 
(0.0368) 
0.2359***   
(0.0383) 
Observations 124656 117828 117828 117828 117828 117828 117828 117828 117828 117828 
F-Statistics 11997.52 9418.54 9173.19 9173.66 9169.00 9172.31 9183.02 9168.80 9172.67 9171.15 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F 
statistic  
 
84.585 
 
69.25 47.65 51.26 44.54 47.10 36.84 32.29 46.39 131.429 
Paap-
Kleibergen F-
Statistic 
78.132 64.24 44.56 47.55 42.12 43.35 34.00 29.64 42.96 126.125 
Other control variables include age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, marital status dummy, ethnic capital, time dummy, infrastructure 
capital (electricity availability dummy and time to get to water source), LGA fixed effects, geopolitical and state fixed effects ,  and geographic 
variables (latitude, longitude and altitude). Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 
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Appendix 15: Testing the Impact of Labour Market Entry (LME) Before & After 1986 SAP Programme Assuming Different Ages of LME (From 
Pooled 2008 & 2013 Nigerian Demographic & Health Survey Data) 
            
Panel A: Second Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth)     
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Schooling 
(years) 
0.2483***   
(0.0522) 
0.2871***    
(0.0548) 
0.4025***  
(0.0780) 
0.5094***   
(0.1307) 
0.4146***   
(0.1102) 
0.4194***   
(0.1517) 
0.4849**  
(0.2232) 
0.3937 
(0.2524) 
0.4930   
(0.3400) 
0.2197   
(0.1509) 
0.1836   
(0.1573) 
Other 
Controls 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
LME (SAP) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Panel B: First Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment (Measured in Years)     
UPE_E 0.5571***   
(0.0416) 
0.5827***   
(0.0449) 
0.4990***   
(0.0519) 
0.3052***   
(0.0508) 
0.3155***    
(0.0467) 
0.2258***    
(0.0461) 
0.1557***   
(0.0452) 
0.1285***   
(0.0444) 
0.0994**  
(0.0438) 
0.1958***   
(0.0427) 
0.1855***   
(0.0425)   
Observations 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 134613 
F-Statistics 11098.10 11093.67 11087.99 11090.51 11099.47 11121.01 11158.81 11194.89 11231.62 11234.45 11268.96 
Cragg-
Donald Wald 
F statistic  
 
196.77 178.36 95.57 37.83 48.532 25.65 12.72 9.03 5.56 22.69 20.69 
Paap-
Kleibergen 
F-Statistic 
182.60 168.62 92.47 36.10 45.708 24.03 11.85 8.38 5.14 21.00 19.11 
LME is labour market entry age. Indicator variables are developed from SAP as age at 1986 minus assumed LME age. Positive values are assigned 
1, otherwise zero. Other control variables include age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, marital status dummy, ethnic capital, time 
dummy, infrastructure capital (electricity availability dummy and time to get to water source), LGA fixed effects, geopolitical and state fixed effects,  
and geographic variables (latitude, longitude and altitude). Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 16: Robustness to Imperfect Instrument Tests (From Pooled 2008 & 2013 Nigerian Demographic & Health Survey Data) 
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Panel A: Second Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Log of Wealth)  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Method IV UCI  
(0--0.01) 
UCI  
(0--0.001) 
UCI  
(0--0.0001) 
LTZ (U=0.1 & 
sd=0.05) 
LTZ(u=0.01 & 
sd=0.005) 
LTZ(u=0.001 & 
sd=0.0005) 
IV 
Schooling (years) 0.3022***   
(0.0834)   
NA NA NA 0.1565   
(0.1679) 
0.2876***   
(0.0846) 
0.3007*** 
(0.0834) 
0.3320*** 
(0.0707) 
Schooling (years) Lower 
Bound 
NA -0.1457 0.1114       0.1360       -0.1726     0.1217  0.1373     NA 
Schooling (years) Upper 
Bound 
NA 0.4656 0. 4656 0.4656 0.4855 0.4535 0.4642 NA 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First Stage Results (Dependent Variable: Schooling Attainment (Measured in Years)  
UPE_E 0.3485***   
(0.039) 
NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.1000   (0.0904) 
UPE_E5 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.4667***   
(0.0847) 
Observations 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 124656 
F-Statistics 10568.85 NA NA NA NA NA NA 9959.15 
Cragg-Donald Statistic  
 
84.58 NA NA NA NA NA NA 58.26 
Paap-Kleibergen F-Statistic 78.13 NA NA NA NA NA NA 54.13 
OVERID NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.4572 
NA is not applicable. UCI is Union of Confidence Interval approach & LTZ is Local to Zero approach. In the UCI method the assumption of perfect exogene ity between instrument 
and error is replaced with near perfect exogeneity with assumed correlation values of 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001 for columns 2-4. U is mean and s.d is standard deviation. In the LTZ 
approach, we specify the entire distribution (in terms of mean and standard deviation) which the coefficient of the plausibly exogenous variable can take as (u=0.1 
& s.d=0.05), (u=0.01 & s.d=0.005) and (u=0.001 & s.d =0.0005) in columns 5-7. Other control variables include age, age-squared, sector dummy, gender dummy, marital status 
dummy, ethnic capital, time dummy, infrastructure capital (electricity availability dummy and time to get to water source), LGA fixed effects, geopolitical and state fixed effects,  and 
geographic variables (latitude, longitude and altitude). Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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